Defining the Enemy: Military Occupation, Security Structures, and Transfers of Experience in the German-dominated Baltics (1915–1918)

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This paper argues that the security measures imposed by the Germans in the occupied Baltics during the First World War should be understood within a broader context, considering the constraints, resource allocations, and transfers of experience within a German Empire that had become a European-scale occupying power. It examines key security structures from both the Western and Eastern Fronts, highlighting the lack of preparedness in the initial stages of the war and the reliance on a mix of improvisation and transfers of experience from distant occupation regimes on other fronts. In the Baltics, a shortage of qualified police, particularly with language skills, led to increased reliance on locals, exploiting the ethnic diversity and specificities of the occupied region. This dynamic expanded the definition of "enemy," inventing new categories and blurring existing ones.

Keywords: First World War, German occupation, Transfers of Experience, Secret Police, Ober Ost.

Introduction and Context

In 1916, the newly appointed Chief-of-Staff of the German 8th Army Lieutenant General Traugott von Sauberzweig arrived in occupied Courland. Not long after he wrote a circular to the Ober Ost HQ in Kaunas, stating that in terms of repressive policy, "it is not enough to obey the law to the letter" – punishment must be "clear and repulsive, adapted to the low cultural level of the [occupied] population so that they can even barely attempt to understand why they are being punished."[1]

Lieutenant General von Sauberzweig, up until his arrival in the Baltics, held the post of Military Governor of Brussels. Due to his brutality and governance methods, most notably the ordered execution of well-known British nurse Edith Cavell – promptly after her condemnation to death – which received unprecedented

1 Schrift. Chef des Generalstabes von Sauberzweig. 24.01.1916. Lietuvos mokslų akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka Rankraščių skyrius (Wroblewski Library of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, hereinafter – LMAVB RS), F23-1/1. l. 92.

international attention[2], he was dismissed from his post. Now, he was to apply his governance experience and ruthless approach in the occupied Baltics, where the military exercised an unparalleled monopoly of control.

This transfer of a German official from one zone of occupation to another, and with him the methods developed in the first context to be adapted to the second, is not a totally isolated case. It shows that while occupied zones are generally characterised by a high degree of isolation from the rest of the world, their functioning must also integrate the various connections between them. This dynamic of isolation and connection is particularly at work in the very specific regime of military occupation established by the Germans in the Baltic region and generally known as Ober Ost, and it affected its own security policy.

From 1915 to 1918, the Baltic countries were dominated in large part, and then in their entirety, by the German Empire, facing one of the major dimensions of the First World War – military occupation; a war-time phenomenon that is not only central to our understanding of the conflict and its various processes, but that brought forth an intricate web of imperial dominance models, underpinning and reshaping the political, social and cultural landscapes for years to come on both a national and regional scale.

Imperial domination through transformative models of military occupation became an integral part of the war experience for millions of people on a never-before seen extent.[3] Paramount to the attempts at the "successful" functioning of these models, often characterized by the instrumentalization of peoples, exploitation of resources, repression, and emerging plans for continued institutionalized control, were the concepts of security and threat, and the frameworks applied (or lack thereof) by the occupying power to contain and address these issues in the rear of the occupying armies – in the light of ongoing, sustained and unpredictable warfare.

The military issues of security in the occupied regions were intrinsically linked to the ongoing conflict and its regional developments. From this perspective, the future of the Baltics along with their hypothetical statehood remained a subject of conflicting conceptions. Nonetheless, this horizon of uncertainty did not prevent the occupying regime from developing its own security policy, and it also helped to make it even more necessary. Therefore, the concepts of threat and security were not viewed from the perspective of the occupied or potential models of Baltic statehood, but rather from that of long-term domination.

To understand the way in which this security policy was envisioned and implemented, it is necessary to broaden the framework and consider the European scale, which saw the German Empire wage a war on several fronts – both as an industrial war and a war of occupation. This paper aims to argue, by using the example of key security structures of the German occupation authorities, that the security measures

2 See : Pickles, K. Transnational Outrage. The Death and Commemoration of Edith Cavell. Basingstoke – New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007; Debruyne, E. Le réseau Edith Cavell. Des femmes et des hommes en résistance. Brussels : Racine, 2015.

3 Sk.: Schaepdrijver, S. De. Military occupation, political imaginations, and the First World War. In: First World War Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2013. pp. 1–5.

in the Baltics during the First World War should be understood not only by analysing the framework of regional and local (national) issues, but also by dealing with the constraints, the resource allocations, and the transfers of experience in a German Empire that became an occupying power at the European scale.

Improvisations

When the German armies penetrated the territory of the Russian Empire, first on the borders of Lithuania in September 1914, then decisively in Lithuania and Courland in the spring and summer of 1915, the German armed forces were not entirely without a body dedicated to ensuring their security against threats such as espionage or sabotage. Each army could count on a unit of the army's secret police, the *Geheime Feldpolizei* (hereafter – GFP), which was assigned to it. The German 8th Army, which carried out most of the operations in the Baltics, was no exception.

It is important to realise, however, that there was a complete disproportion between the task and the means provided to accomplish it. The GFP was a police force existing only on paper, at least until war broke out. It was created on the basis of experience gained during the German army's previous campaigns – in 1866 (Austro-Prussian War) and 1870–1871 (Franco-Prussian War), almost half a century earlier.[4] During these campaigns, which had only lasted a few months, a small secret police unit had been set up to ensure the security of the Grand Staff and the personalities surrounding it, starting with the King of Prussia. However, these initial experiences revealed the need to better anticipate future requirements, by extending the powers and manpower of the secret police and by decentralising it so that not only the main headquarters were protected, but also each of the armies in the field. This was achieved by a reorganisation in 1891, which provided for the military mobilisation to be accompanied by the mobilisation of police officers seconded from the major municipal police forces. These police officers were required to act with complete discretion, and were therefore obliged to operate in civilian clothes and not in uniform. In military terms, their actions had also to be supervised by the intelligence officer (*Nachrichtenoffizier*) of the army to which they were assigned. In peacetime, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior kept an updated list of the names of police officers who could be mobilised in this way. They were selected in consultation with the police prefectures (*Polizeipräsidien*) concerned, on the basis of their skills in foreign languages and in criminal policing. Each army had to be supported by a GFP unit made up of a *Feldpolizeikommissar* supervising the activities of 6 *Feldpolizeibeamten*, while other GFP police officers were specifically assigned to the protection of the Grand Headquarters.

4 Reszöhazy, E. Les polices secrètes allemandes en France et en Belgique ocupées pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. D'une police de renseignement à une police d'occupation. Cahiers inlichtingenstudies / Cahiers d'Etudes du Renseignement, n°12, German Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence in Belgium during the 20th Century, 2023. pp. 57–75.

However, in peacetime, the fight against espionage, which was one of the main prerogatives of such a police force, had remained the responsibility of the civil authorities. Between the end of the 19th century and the First World War, the German federal states had created specialised structures in this field, which were attached to the police prefectures and which also acted as political police to combat subversive activities: the *Zentralpolizeistellen*, set up in the capitals of the main federal states (Prussia, Bavaria, etc.) as well as in Alsace-Lorraine. The whole system was highly decentralised, with each one operating in its own area, which poses coordination problems. As a result, before the war there was no single counter-espionage or political police organisation responsible for the entire territory of the German Empire. The GFP was non-existent other than on an administrative level until the outbreak of the conflict. There was also no body in the German Empire designed or prepared to serve as a secret police force dedicated to ensuring security in enemy territories that might come to be occupied.

As planned, the outbreak of war led to the creation of GFP units in the various armies[5]. On each of the two fronts, a *Feldpolizeidirektor* was responsible for coordinating these small GFP units. However, as the Moltke-Schlieffen plan provided for the concentration of most of the German armed forces in the West, the Eastern Front was initially held by a single army. As a result, *Feldpolizeidirektor* Karl Frost, who was assigned to the East, had even less manpower than *Feldpolizeidirektor* Maximilian Bauer, his counterpart in the West, who supervised the GFPs of seven armies. At the start of the conflict, Frost could only rely on the half-dozen officers assigned to the 8th Army and their handful of colleagues protecting the Great Headquarter of the Eastern Front, the *Oberbefehlshaber Ost*. Most of them were seconded from the municipal police forces of the major cities in the east of the Empire, namely Berlin, Danzig and Breslau, but can be seen as highly qualified. Many had criminal police backgrounds, and more than half spoke Polish or even Russian.

These paltry staffs were gradually increased by the creation of new armies – starting with the 9th Army in September 1914 – and by the allocation of new police officers to each of these armies, drawn from a growing number of German localities. The number of police officers rose from around twenty in August 1914 to almost 40 in January 1915, and to around 80 in the spring of 1915, while a reorganisation effort was made to adapt to the new realities created by the geostrategic development of the Eastern Front[6]. In April 1915, the GFP's area of responsibility in the East was divided into three sections: the first, directed by a *Feldpolizeizentralstelle*, covered the whole of the army zone, just before the front, the so-called *Etappen- und Operationsgebiet* (stage and operations zone); the second covered the eastern provinces of the German Empire outside the first zone; and the third, also directed by a *Feldpolizeizentralstelle*, extended over the Polish territories of the Russian Empire that had come under German control but which, as a result of the advance of German troops, were no longer covered by the army zone. The management of the first of these

5 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Prussian Secret State Archives, hereafter – GStA), HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1206 Nr. 6 Einrichtung einer geheimen Feldpolizei, Bd. 9.

6 GStA, HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1206 Nr. 6 Einrichtung einer geheimen Feldpolizei, Bd. 9 and 10.

three zones, which now largely extended into occupied territory, was entrusted to the *Felpolizeikommissar* Hartenstein, who, significantly, was detached from a GFP unit on the Western Front.

This was a clear case of transferring police personnel trained on the job as secret police in occupied territory in the West to take on a similar mission in the newly occupied territories of the East. The fact remains, however, that the GFP, with its 80 police officers for the whole of the Eastern Front, proved to be totally inadequate when the need to act as a real occupation secret police was added to its initial mission. The occupation of vast swathes of the Tsarist empire, in Poland and the Baltics, considerably broadened the definition of the potential enemy. It was no longer just a matter of unmasking a few agents operating for the opposing forces, but of guarding against actions potentially emanating from the occupied population as a whole.

In the case of the centralized military system of Ober Ost, which already ruled more than 100 000 km^2 and their 3 millions inhabitants at the end of 1915,[7] and was geographically extended throughout the Baltics with various adjusted structural changes in 1917–1918, the occupying army and the governance authorities established within its structure was faced with a complex range of problems. Initially and most prominently – the question of political stability and possible resistance, considering not just the vast geographical space of Ober Ost, which encompassed an immense part of North-Eastern Europe, but also the various different nationalities (Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Belarussians, Estonians etc.) now put under one centralized occupying authority that required a unified governance policy which would consider both the proximity of the frontline and the various political and national leanings in a relatively unknown land.

Among the multiple structures set up by the Ober Ost in order to rule its vast territory, was the Secret Gendarmerie (*Geheimgendarmerie*). The Secret Gendarmerie was established as a part of the advancing Niemen Army (initially detached from the 8th Army) and funded by the Courland Military Administration (a territorial subdivision of the Ober Ost). It was a reaction to the possibility, as pointed out by Freiherr von Kapherr, the commander and founder of the Secret Gendarmerie, that the retreating Russian Army would have left behind diversion specialists and saboteurs.[8] It is safe to assume that the Secret Gendarmerie (and its initial formation) was modelled after the GFP – as the Niemen Army was rather a quickly-set-up on lacked such structures during its initial advance.[9] While the GFP was active in the army zone, the Secret Gendarmerie was formed in the rear-area of occupied-Courland in July 1915. Its

7 Das Land Ober Ost. Deutsche Arbeit in den Verwaltungsgebieten Kurland, Litauen und Białystok-Grodno. Stuttgart: Verlag der Presseabteilung Ober Ost, 1917. pp. 431–432.

8 Entwurf für Einrichtung einer geheimen Polizeiorganisation in den besetzten Gebieten von Litauen und Kurland. 15.07.1915. LMAVB RS, F23–17/2, l. 217.; V. Kapherr. Mitteilung an die Herren Kreishauptleute, 27.08.1915. Latvijas Nacionālā arhīva Latvijas Valsts Vēstures arhīvs (Latvian State Historical Archive of the National Archives of Latvia, hereinafter – LNA LVVA), 6419. f., 1. apr., 21. l., 46. lp.

9 The Niemen Army was formed in late May 1915 on the basis of the advancing cavalry-based army group of Lieutenant General Otto von Lauenstein. In December 1915, it was renamed as the German 8th Army.

tasks included not only to intercept possible enemy spies in German-occupied land, also to monitor the population, observe the general mood (also – to influence and promote sentiment in favour of German rule), note statements about the political situation, attempts to incite riots, form underground organizations, hide Russian soldiers, and any other aspects undesirable to the German regime.[10] Its tasks were thus the initial missions of the GFP, but it also functioned as a political police.

The most lucrative and visible case of the activities of the Secret Gendarmerie and its agents is the threat assessment and operational engagements on the Eastern Baltic Sea coast of Courland in Autumn 1915, when Freiherr von Kapherr, based on various reports about the signalling to Russian warship at night and attacks on German sentries gave the order to several agents to investigate the coastal villages for anti-German actions. During the operation, which involved dressing as Russian officers, pursuing targets in woods and infiltrating groups of suspects, the Secret Gendarmerie uncovered several organized cells which not only actively agitated against German rule, but also hid and materially supported escaped Russian POWs. This operation was followed by severe actions on the part of the occupier – Freiherr von Kapherr's report to the Military Administration led to the deportation of the population that lived in a 15-kilometer strip of the coastline in November 1915.[11] Thus, by applying infiltration tactics and other methods, the Secret Gendarmerie quickly managed to establish itself a serious force of the occupier, carrying out various undercover operations in Courland already in the first months of the occupation.

Transfers of Experience / Experiences of Occupations in Europe: Belgium, Poland

The problems facing the German forces from the summer of 1915 were not unique to the occupied Baltics. In the West, such a situation had existed since the first weeks of the war. Although it had failed to capture Paris and defeat the French armies, the huge German offensive of summer 1914 – at the time the largest military operation of all time – actually had enabled the German Empire to occupy vast territories, including almost all of Belgium and part of north-eastern France, covering ten French departments.

Here too, the GFP quickly proved to be understaffed, and its missions initially too narrowly conceived. With 80 police officers in October 1914, the GFP was supposed to provide security for the German troops in an area of nearly 50 000 km^2 with a population of almost 10 million. The problem was not that of so-called Belgian "*francs-tireurs*", who were supposed to have harassed the German troops during the invasion. This myth was skilfully perpetuated in Germany to justify the massacres

10 Entwurf für Einrichtung einer geheimen Polizeiorganisation in den besetzten Gebieten von Litauen und Kurland. 15.07.1915. LMAVB RS, F23–17/2, l. 217.; Instruktion für die in den von Zivilverwaltung der Njemenarmee besetzten feindlichen Gebieten stationierten Geheimagenten, 28.08.1915. LMAVB RS, F23–17/1, l. 85.

11 Polizeibericht, 12, 23.10.1915. LMAVB RS, F23–17/1, l. 57.; Bürgermeister Windau an den Kreishauptmann Graf Keyserling, 13.11.1915. LNA LVVA , 767. f., 1. apr., 98. l., 6.–8. lp.

committed during the invasion as reprisals.[12] Whatever the dubious reality during the German invasion, no acts of this type were actually committed during the ensuing occupation. This does not mean that the secret police found itself without a threat and therefore without an enemy, as numerous unarmed networks were created by occupied people to harm the German domination. Thousands of Belgians and French were involved in military intelligence reporting to the allied services, in escape lines helping allied soldiers and volunteers to exit the occupied country and to join the allied armies, and in underground newspapers trying to keep the patriotic flame burning in the occupied population. In addition to these clandestine threats, there were also acts and words deemed subversive, particularly any form of criticism of the occupying forces' policies. From the end of autumn 1914, as the war and the occupation became more and more entrenched, the German occupation regime in Belgium, the Government-General of Brussels, felt it necessary to set up its own secret police, as the GFP was only supposed to deal with territories of the army zone, immediately behind the front and under the immediate control of the German armies.

From the outset, idea of creating a new secret police specifically dedicated to the occupied country reflected a change in the tasks of secret policing, insofar as unlike the GFP, which was designed to ensure the security of the troops, the new organisation was created by and for a regime whose *raison d'être* was military occupation (whereas this was only a de facto situation for armies in the field). Admittedly, The Government-General was temporary in nature, but its basis was more stable than that of an army in the field, and it is partly because of this that it was invested with a political dimension in addition to its military function. As such, its secret police had also to be conceived from the outset as a political police force targeting the local population.

On 25 December 1914, a *Zentralpolizeistelle* was officially created in Brussels, even though the first police officers had arrived a few days earlier.[13] Its mission was to carry out counter-espionage and political policing on the territory of the Brussels Government-General, of which it was one of the sections. As such, it was answerable to the Governor-General, who was himself a sort of viceroy answerable only to the Emperor. In other words, the *Zentralpolizeistelle* had a great deal of room for manoeuvre. In practice, its work was also linked to that of the military courts of the Government-General, for whose benefit it often acted as a judicial police force, while retaining complete independence from them. To the *Zentralpolizeistelle* were subordinated five sections, which shared the country's territory. Each section (*Polizeiabschnitt*) had several polices offices (*Polizeistellen*) within its area, usually in the main cities or sometimes in smaller towns in strategic locations, such as near a border.

12 Horne, J., Kramer, A. German Atrocities. A History of Denial. New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 2001.

13 Reszöhazy, E. Les polices secrètes allemandes en France et en Belgique ocupées pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. D'une police de renseignement à une police d'occupation. Cahiers inlichtingenstudies / Cahiers d'Etudes du Renseignement, n°12, German Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence in Belgium during the 20th Century, 2023. pp. 57–75.

It is within these local police offices that the heart of the surveillance and investigation work was carried out. Contrary to what its name might suggest, the *Zentralpolizeistelle* was in fact a fairly decentralised body, with most of its nervous activity taking place in its local branches rather than at its centre. The function of the head office was to manage and allocate personnel and material resources to subordinate levels. In addition to this purely administrative function, which explains why the proportion of professional policemen was lower in its staff than in the police offices, it also provided certain specialised technical services that the local offices had neither the means nor the competence to carry out, such as cracking the most complex codes or developing operations to intoxicate enemy intelligence services. Finally, it also took into account a certain number of tasks that only made sense at the highest level, such as the relations with *Abteilung IIIB*, the German army intelligence service, or the control of the mails of foreign embassies. The work of coordinating the local offices was carried out by the sections and, if necessary, by the head office.

This organisation specifically dedicated to the secret policing in occupied zone, achieved results: from the spring of 1915, networks were dismantled one after another, and trials led to the execution or deportation of those convicted.[14] However, the task was never-ending, as new networks replaced those previously destroyed, right up to the end of the occupation.

Nevertheless, the model seemed convincing, so much so that it was not long before it was replicated when the German Empire began occupying Poland. Rather than waiting several months, as in the case of Belgium, before setting up an organisation dedicated to this task, the German occupation authorities created a *Zentralpolizeistelle Polen* in the spring of 1915 for the part of the Polish territory under German control.[15] Its remit was identical to that of its counterpart in Belgium, albeit in a rather different political and geostrategic context, that of the occupation not of a small neutral country, but of a peripheral fringe of an immense multi-ethnic empire. In fact, this new *Zentralpolizeistelle* did not start from scratch: it replaced and drew its initial management and staff from the *Feldpolizeizentralstelle* based in Poland, but it now operated outside the GFP, and became subordinated to the newly created Government-General of Warsaw in August 1915. The security arrangements in the East were now similar to those in the west: while the GFP operated in the army zone, a *Zentralpolizeistelle* independent of the GFP looked after the occupied hinterland under the rule of a Government-General.

The same formula was used again on 4 September 1915 when the *Zentralpolizeistelle Litauen* was formed. From the outset, the *Zentralpolizeistelle Litauen* had to be staffed by a large number of officers, especially when compared with the paltry numbers in the GFP at the start of the conflict: in October 1915, around 80 police officers were to join its ranks. Faced with the risk of unfavourable military developments, however, its headquarters was initially set up in Tilsit, i.e. on the territory of the German Empire, before moving to Kaunas (Kowno). The uncertainty around

14 See: van Ypersele, L., Debruyne, E. De la guerre de l'ombre aux ombres de la guerre. L'espionnage en Belgique durant la guerre 1914–1918. Histoire et mémoire. Brussels: Labor, 2004.

15 GStA, HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1206 Nr. 6 Einrichtung einer geheimen Feldpolizei, Bd. 11.

its name, sometimes called *Zentralpolizeistelle Litauen*, and sometimes *Litauen und Kurland*, seems to reflect the uncertainty about the exact limits of its area of jurisdiction, as it coexisted during several months with the *Geheimgendarmerie* operating in Courland.

However, the stabilisation of the front and the establishment of the Ober Ost provided an opportunity to reorganise and systematise the scheme. Despite the nature of the Ober Ost, which was a purely military creation, completely subject to the views of the highest level of the German army (unlike the General-Governments of Brussels and Warsaw, which were autonomous political entities), the same secret police model was adopted (and adapted). On 13 March 1916, the *Zentralpolizeistelle Litauen* took definitely the name *Zentralpolizeistelle Litauen-Kurland*, or more commonly *Zentralpolizeistelle Kowno*, as it was now based in Kaunas, at the heart of the Ober Ost, over whose entire territory its power now extended.[16] The rear area of the various armies on the front remained the exclusive domain of the GFP, and the Secret Gendarmerie operating in Courland was probably disbanded at that time, and its staff incorporated in the *Zentralpolizeistelle*. Erich Ludendorff's decree of 4 April 1916 set out its territorial organisation, which was divided into 10 sections, each covering one of the six military administrations that made up the territory of the Ober Ost, with the exception of the military administration of Lithuania and Suwałki, which each comprised three. Each section (*Polizeiabschnitt*) was in turn made up of several police offices (*Poliziestellen*), established in different towns to ensure maximum coverage. This territorial organisation was thus based on the principles of what had been set up in Belgium and then in Poland. Even if the lack of preserved sources does not allow us to state this with certainty, we can assume that the general operation followed the same model. The fact that the region was larger and less connected also argues in favour of adopting the same operating model, based on a high degree of autonomy for local police offices. The basic missions were actually the same, one of the most crucial being the counter-espionage. For the period from August to September 1916, around a hundred people were arrested each month (probably for the sole area covered by the GFP) on suspicion of espionage, with almost a third of them receiving heavy sentences, including death.[17] The *Zentralpolizeistelle Kowno* was nonetheless developing its own specific features, in particular to meet the (sometimes somewhat unrealistic) demands of the Ober Ost, which was implementing what it describes as a *Verkehrspolitik*, through which it intended to control all movements of people on its territory. To this end, the *Zentralpolizeistelle* superimposed eight railway detachments on its territorial structure, with 35 passenger control points depending on them. The secret police were tasked not only with checking identity papers, passes and tickets, but also any type of written or printed material carried by passengers. This *Verkehrspolitik* is important for understanding just how broad the

16 Befehl- und Verordnungsblatt des Oberbefehlshabers Ost. Nr. 18. 07.04.1916. LNA LVVA, 6418. f., 1. apr., 8. l., 140. – 141. lp.

17 Hauptmann Heise, Feldpolizeidirektor beim Ob.-Ost, Die Arbeitsweise des russischen Nachrichtendienstes nach den Erfahrungen der geheimen Feldpolizei Ob.Ost in den Monaten August bis Oktober 1916. 28.11.1916. Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv (Military Archive of the German Federal Archives, hereafter – BArch MA), PH-3/410.

definition of the enemy was for the "military fantasy" that was the Ober Ost, a regime that sought to control and regulate in a military fashion the functioning of the occupied society, widely perceived as uncivilised.[18] From this perspective, the notion of the enemy was no longer solely political and military in nature, but extended to everything beyond the control of the army.

Adaptations

Although the creation of a *Zentralpolizeistelle* specifically designed to ensure the security of the occupation regime appeared at the time to be a winning formula, it was in fact just as much a challenge. The creation of these bodies, which came on top of the need to reinforce the GFP on both fronts, required a large number of professional police officers, who had to be drawn from the German municipal police forces, which were under great pressure due to mobilisation and over-solicitation in wartime. The Prussian Ministry of the Interior, even if it extended the levies to small towns and called on the other federated entities of the German Empire, found it increasingly difficult to find professionally and linguistically competent personnel[19]. Actually, the creation and extension of new police forces in the expanding territories under German occupation aggravated a systemic stress of the whole German home police system.

However, in the linguistic field, the somewhat simplistic concepts that had governed the pre-war preparation of the GFP "on paper" did not turn out to be very well adapted to the reality of the occupations. The German authorities had essentially considered the required language skills in terms of the official languages of the main potential opposing armies. In other words, the police officers selected were chosen for their knowledge of French, English and Russian. At the very most, knowledge of Polish was considered. The war of occupation meant that the enemy had to be redefined linguistically on the basis of the reality of the occupied territory. And this proved to be far more complex than initially envisaged. In the West, it turned out that almost half of the occupied population did not speak French as mother tongue, but in fact Flemish, a variety of Dutch that none of the GFP members initially recruited had been required to know. If finding police officers with a command of this language was turning out to be difficult in the West, the situation was going to prove even more complex in Eastern Europe.

Indeed, the ethnic and linguistic reality faced by the German occupiers in Ober Ost was far more complicated than that encountered in Belgium or France. The encounter with the "mixture of peoples", as Erich Ludendorff later put it in his memoirs[20], bred not only evolving ideas of modernization through conquest, restructure

18 More on the various aspects of Verkehrspolitik see: Liulevicius, V. War Land on the Eastern Front. Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. pp. 89 – 112.; Richter, K. 'Go with the hare's ticket' mobility and territorial policies in Ober Ost (1915–1918). First World War Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2015. pp. 151–170.

19 GStA, HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1206 Nr. 6 Einrichtung einer geheimen Feldpolizei, Bd. 8–12.

20 Ludendorff, E. Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914 – 1918. Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1919. S. 138.

and colonization in the mental maps of the occupiers, but forced them to look for ways to ensure long-term cohesion in ever-changing security dynamics. In this perspective, communication with the populace became a central problem, given the different languages spoken by the occupied. Alfred Vagts, a lieutenant of the German 8th Army, who was stationed in the vicinity of Daugavpils in south-eastern Latvia in 1918, described it as facing "ethnographic conditions", and stressed that: "no one who is to undertake administration of foreign territory should underestimate the language problem; preferably he should learn one language rather than a hundred laws [..]".[21] One of the solutions was the use of members of the clergy – they were instructed to communicate laws adopted by the occupation authorities to their respective communities during Sunday sermons, or as the Latvian farmer Kārlis Vesmanis noted in his diary – "preaching Prussian laws on how to act according to the new calendar".[22]

For the occupying authorities, communicating with the occupied populations was one thing, but keeping a close eye on them was another, much more complex task. Finding police officers with a good command of Lithuanian or Latvian, not to mention Belarusian, became a a significant problem. The first requests for police officers who could speak Lithuanian did not arrive until June 1915, which shows the extent to which this aspect had been poorly anticipated. Needless to say, such profiles proved to be particularly rare, even though the search for Polish speakers had initially been fairly easy to satisfy, as eastern Germany was populated by many Polish speakers. In a list of men likely to be assigned to the newly-created *Zentralpolizeistelle Litauen*, the *Polizeipräsidium Berlin* revealed that of the 55 police officers approached, 43 spoke Polish, 4 had some knowledge of Russian and only one spoke Lithuanian[23]. Nonetheless, although the fact of having German citizens who were ethnically Polish seemed at first sight to be an important asset for secret police missions in the General Government of Warsaw and in the regions of the Ober Ost that included – as in Vilnius – large Polish minorities, such profiles did not go without arousing suspicion. Exchanges of letters between German authorities show that one or other candidate was rejected because his profile was too "Polish", raising fears of dubious loyalty to the German Empire[24]. It is interesting to note that, in this case, the broadening of the concept of the enemy led to a questioning of the identification of those who were supposed to be fighting him, by bringing to light troubling similarities that blurred the boundary between friend and foe.

In Belgium, this situation encouraged the GFP and *Zentralpolizeistelle* offices to use local auxiliaries, who had the double advantage of being able to speak the language and to blend in with occupied society. A study of the profile of these agents,

21 Vagts, A. A Memoir of Military occupation. Military Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1943. p. 16. – 24.

22 Vesmanis, F. Klausieties pagātnes soļos. Jelgava: Ģ. Eliasa Jelgavas Vēstures un mākslas muzejs, 2013. 137., 139. lpp.

23 Liste von Beamten des Kgl. Polizeipräsidiums Berlin, deren überweisung zur Zentralpolizeistellen für Litauen und Kurlan erwünscht ist, 28.9.1915. GStA, HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1206 Nr. 6 Einrichtung einer geheimen Feldpolizei, Bd.11.

24 See the correspondence about the policeman Danielewski as soon as August 1914 in: GStA, HA Rep. 77, Tit. 1206 Nr. 6 Einrichtung einer geheimen Feldpolizei, Bd.11.

based on the trials to which they were subjected after the war, reveals that they were generally relatively marginal individuals within occupied society, some of whom had "a score to settle" with it[25]. While resentment was a motivating factor, it did not prevent the secret police offices from offering significant financial incentives, in the form of bonuses or regular salaries, depending on the case, which were all the more attractive when the occupied society was in acute economic and food distress. The local collaborators included men and women and both Flemish and French speakers, but most of them came from the working classes or the very lower middle classes. The most effective of these agents were even given the official status of auxiliary policeman, which meant that they could hold papers certifying their status and carry a handgun. The information available on the dismantling of resistance networks reveals that most of the time, these moles and informers played a very important role in the detection and infiltration of clandestine organisations, and sometimes in the arrests themselves and during the examination.

In the Ober Ost region, the ongoing shortage of staff, particularly those with sufficient language skills, was leading the Germans to realize quite early that it was necessary and even pivotal to rely on the involvement of the occupied themselves in order to know local conditions, identify threats, as well as maintain order and security. This meant that, despite the public claims of modernization through strict "German order" and superiority in all fields of governance policy, local collaborators were needed for a successful functioning of the regime. This can be observed already in 1915, shortly after the invasion, when Latvian military-age men were used as armed security patrolling the streets of towns as Liepāja (Libau) or Jelgava (Mitau).[26] This use of local collaborators was just as true for the German secret police. This was also the case for the Secret Gendarmerie, which relied almost exclusively on the collaboration of the local populace. Priority was given to Jews and Baltic Germans with at least some knowledge of spoken Latvian, as Latvians were regarded as a threat based on the perceived historical animosity parts of the population felt towards Germans.[27] However, reliance on locals as agents and informants brought severe and unforeseen risks. In June 1917, for example, the rear administration of the 10th Army, in a letter to the heads of Ober Ost military administrations, stressed that despite the overall successful collaboration with local informants, it was necessary to observe strict caution, as there where many cases when German soldiers were killed while being escorted through "shortcuts" in unknown areas; thus they deemed it necessary to establish a system where two locally-recruited agents would be sent together to accomplish the same task, hoping that they would inform on each other's activities.[28]

25 Bost, M., Rezsöhazy, E. À contre-courant. Les agents du contre-espionnage allemand en Belgique occupée durant la Première Guerre mondiale. In : Connolly, J., Debruyne, E. Julien, E., Meirlaen, M (Eds). En territoire ennemi. Les occupations de la Grande Guerre et leurs héritières, 1914–1954. Lille : Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2018. pp. 31–42.

26 I Verwaltungsbericht der Deutschen Verwaltung für Kurland. Oktober 1915. S. 13. Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (Main State Archives Stuttgart, hereinafter – HStAS), E 130 a, Bü 1157.

27 Schrift, Chef des Generalstabes Ludendorff, 29.09.1916. LMAVB RS, F23–1/1, l. 111.

28 Schrift der Etappen-Inspektion 10, 09.06.1917. LMAVB RS, F23–1/2, l. 310.

The Ober Ost authorities were careful to distinguish between, and even essentialise, ethnic groups and to adapt their policies to each of them to ensure better control of the country. In Lithuania, for example, to control occupied society, the secret police could take advantage of the tensions between ethnic groups, which were often exacerbated by the war. By taking on the role of "protectors" of each of these groups, Ober Ost authorities initially intended to eradicate Russian domination of these regions. However, this policy led them to crystallise the identities even more, and to create conflicts between them over the allocation of resources in a context of shortages, conflicts in which the Germans could play the role of referee. Despite the growing animosity felt by the occupied against the Germans as a result of the harshness of their regime, individuals and communities felt far less scruple than in the West about playing the 'German card' to defend their own interests. In his memoirs, Jonas Basanavičius, one of the founding fathers of Lithuanian nationalism, described his own arrest on 3 December 1916 in Vilnius, by agents of the *Zentralpolizeistelle*. He attributed his arrest to a denunciation by the Poles, but added that when the Germans were carrying out the arrestation, they were accompanied by "a young Jew from Vilnius who knew Lithuanian and Polish"[29]. In addition to the importance of having local support in order to penetrate occupied society in all its diversity, this episode also shows that the *Zentralpolizeistelle*, while taking advantage of rival nationalisms (and, in so doing, fuelling mutual resentment), was also wary of them and saw in them a risk of seeing whole sections of occupied society escape its control in order to pursue national objectives incompatible with the German order. Once again, this dimension clouded the definition of the enemy, as the politics of nationalities resembled a fool's game in which the notions of ally and enemy were particularly unstable and fluid.

In Courland, and later in the rest of Latvia and Estonia, the question arose in different but no less troubling terms, in that they completely blurred the distinction between occupiers and occupied, and therefore once again the very notion of the enemy. Central to Ober Ost occupation policy north of Lithuania was the "discovery" of the loyalty-expressing Baltic German population during the initial invasion in 1915 – an event that played a significant role in the military and political transformations up until the collapse of the occupation regime in 1918. Although only a fraction of the Baltic Germans remained in occupied lands (the pre-war Baltic provinces held a population of 162,000 Baltic Germans in 1914), most greeted the invading Germans as liberators, having suffered a year of repressive policy by the Tsarist authorities, despite being openly loyal to the state in the past decades.[30]

The Baltic Germans presented a dual yet unique problem to the occupiers. On the one hand, the occupied lands of Ober Ost were perceived as a vast, unordered space represented among others by the Latvian population which the military administration deemed as "unable to any national action" and under-developed. On the

29 Basanavičius, J. Mano gyvenimo kronika ir nervų ligos istorija : 1851–1922 m. Vilnius: Baltos Lankos, 1997. p.281.

30 Cerūzis, R. Abās frontes pusēs: vācbaltieši Pirmajā pasaules kara. Latvijas Kara muzeja gadagrāmata, XV. Rīga: Latvijas Kara muzejs, 2014. 194. – 207. lpp.

other hand, they encountered the Baltic Germans that were seen as a modernizing and Western element, or a piece of long-forgotten German homeland, as the head of the Courland military administration Alfred von Gossler remarked.[31]

The encounter with the "Germanness" of the Baltic provinces shaped not just occupation policy, but once again redefined the concept of enemy, creating rifts and forcing search for new adaptation models within the military structures of Ober Ost. Already in the first months of the administration in 1915, the leadership of the military structures in Courland made the decision to rely on the Baltic Germans to exercise power, although not putting them in the category of collaborator. This decision was made purely based on ethnic and linguistic terms, seeing them as a part of the German cause. Given their expressions of undivided loyalty and knowledge of "local affairs", the Baltic Germans were deemed as a perfect fit – especially considering the staff shortages in the military administration and its subordinated structures.[32]

It is possible to put forward two arguments on the relationship dynamics between the German military and the Baltic Germans. First, based on evidence currently available, it is well-grounded to put forward the claim that the Baltic Germans, due to their closeness to the head of the military administration, radicalized the occupation authorities in Courland and later in the rest of the Baltics to enact even more severe policies aimed against the majority of the native population (Latvians, Estonians) than originally intended – through harsh Germanization and colonization plans. This created an unmatched situation where a part of the occupied population that collaborated with the invaders urged the eradication – through restrictions on education, language, movement, and eventually complete colonization – of a whole other part of the occupied population, thus attempting to create a new enemy for the occupier – that would be categorized as such solely on belonging to a certain ethnic and linguistic group.[33] Given the historical animosity between these two groups, which stemmed from economic, social division and the dominance dynamic it formed in the past centuries, German occupation was seen by the Baltic Germans as a chance to achieve radical transformation which bordered ethnic cleansing.

Second, the Baltic Germans were appointed as district heads – highest and most influential post within the Ober Ost structure – to six out of seven of districts in Courland in 1915, filling most leading posts in the central administration in Jelgava (Mitau), as well as later – in the Baltic Military Administration in 1918. This also included courts – as "judgement" could only be passed by ethnic Germans. Due to the lack of preserved sources related to this question, the incorporation of Baltic Germans

31 Alfred von Gossler. Baltische Erinnerungen 1915–1919.BArch MA, N98/2, S. 10–11. See also: Zariņš, K. Vācijas okupācija Latvijas teritorijā 1915.–1918. gadā: militārās pārvaldes priekšnieka Alfrēda fon Goslera atmiņas. Latvijas Arhīvi, Nr. 3/4, 2020. 109. – 135. lpp.

32 Kurland unter Deutscher verwaltung. Vortrag des Verwaltungschefs anläßlich der Anwesenheit des Herrn Landwirtschaftsministers in Mitau am 8. 10. 1915. Suomen Kansallisarkisto (National Archives of Finland), M2620, kansio 16, S. 7.

33 On the dynamics of radicalization and the role of Baltic Germans in the Courland Military Administration see: Zariņš, K. Vācijas militārās pārvaldes politika okupētajā Kurzemes guberņā (1915. gada maijs – 1918. gada marts). Promocijas darbs. Rīga: Latvijas Universitāte, 2022. 103. – 108. lpp.

in the ranks of the secret police of the Ober Ost remains unfortunately unclear, although we can consider it very likely. In any case, by completely blurring the lines between civilian and military, as well as occupier and occupied, the military administration in the Baltics created an unprecedented situation where subjects of a hostile, occupied country took over leading positions in a military administration solely due to their ethnic relation to the occupying metropole. Now, the enemy was within the ranks of Ober Ost – a view shared by many officials of the administration and even regular soldiers.

A changed in this attitude only occurred only in 1917 – 1918, at least in the highest levels of the administration, when Ober Ost saw the utility of using the Baltic Germans to achieve political aims through fictitious self-determination attempts that would ensure German domination long-term – thus, they themselves became a tool of occupation policy in the hands of Ober Ost and Army High Command. Nevertheless, the case of the Baltic Germans served as a striking example of the shifting categories of enemy that the processes of the war imposed upon societies.

As demonstrated, the dynamics of enemy and threat were ever-changing, forcing the German security structures to adapt and identify new risks that emerged given the changing political, social and military contexts. However, a persistent occurrence that accompanied mobile warfare and day-to-day realities of the war in Europe was violence – military and civilian – that gained intensification and more radical expression in societies under occupation, especially on Eastern Fronts. This was evident in the Baltics, where in 1914–1915 manoeuvring armies, shifting frontlines, mobilization, mass migration, social upheaval, extensive exploitative policy through harsh economic measures, and the gradual centralization of the under-staffed occupying authorities created not just local power vacuums, but also breeding grounds for violence and criminality to an unprecedented scale.

One of such phenomena that took place within this framework, was wartime banditry, which emerged as soon as the frontline stabilized in the Baltics in autumn 1915, continuously posing a threat to the order established by the Germans, and characterized by immense violence, robberies, murder, burning of farmsteads, and attacks on both military and civilians, most evidently in Courland and Lithuania. At its core were fugitive Russian soldiers – POWs and deserters, who had remained in the rear or escaped from German camps, hiding in the woods. Due to the demoralizing circumstances, unemployment, requisitions, isolation and harsh German repressive policy, which made it even harder to provide for oneself or family members, they were joined by hundreds of civilians all throughout Ober Ost in order to ensure survival which became more difficult by the day.

Although historians (most notably Abba Strazhas[34]) have attempted to classify this phenomenon as a sort of "resistance movement" in the context of the planned Russian partisan action behind German lines in 1915–1916, recent scholarship has stressed its disorganized, spontaneous nature, outlining several stages in its

34 See: Strazhas, A. Deutsche Ostpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg. Der Fall Ober Ost 1915–1917. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1993.

gradual evolution – from the emergence and forming of several groups throughout the woods of Courland and Lithuania, often supported by the local populace, up until the beginning of open and armed resistance to the German military and Gendarmerie forces, including robberies of the civilian population, which in turn shifted towards excessive robberies that included killings, executions, and the elimination of witnesses by early 1917, due to food shortages and other factors.[35] A year later the initial intent of survival under repressive occupation had changed to pure criminal activity, adapting lawless behaviour that could only function in the political and social realities of 1918.

The German security structures, including the secret police, considered this phenomenon a major threat, and implemented various methods to suppress resistance and banditry. As soon as 1915, the Secret Gendarmerie infiltrated local communities, which led to condemnations and executions of people hiding or providing arms to Russian POWs. The threat also fed the inflation of security forces and the need to develop cooperation between them, be secret as the GFP and the *Zentralpolizeistelle*, or in uniform as the *Feldgendarmerie*. Dangerous joint operations in the field even led to losses among the ranks of the secret police. The most severe response by the Germans was the practice of collective punishment which included public executions, mass deportations, the burning down of farmsteads, and fines for whole parishes. This approach had an ethnic component that stemmed from the German view of the culture of the occupied population, seen as peasants close to their land and generational homes; punishment that would specifically target their homes and communities would have the most effect.[36] One of the most striking cases was that of the Asīte Parish in southwestern Courland in September 1916, when a German gendarme who tried to arrest an escaped Russian POW was attacked by local farmers, killing him. A severe measure of collective punishment followed – by order of the commander of the German 8th Army, the participants were executed, all relatives of the attackers were deported from the parish, and everyone above the age of 16 was forced to pay a fine.[37] Similar incidents that included the burning down of farmsteads and whole communities can be observed throughout the occupied Baltics, showing that the civilian population was caught in-between the violence exerted by both the Germans and the bandit gangs, which gained even more outward expression in 1918, when the occupation shifted from a strict war-time occupation to a more dynamic yet exploitative status quo, where the previously established methods and structures of enacting control began to break down, as political long-term transformation and securing of German domination became a priority.

35 Petronis, V. The Evolution of Wartime Criminality in Lithuania, 1914–1920. In: Balkelis, T., Griffante, A. (Eds) The Shaken Lands. Violence and the Crisis of Governance in East Central Europe, 1914–1923. Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2023. pp. 15 – 41.

36 VI Verwaltungsbericht der Militärverwaltung Kurland. April 1917. S. 8. HStAS, E 130a, Bü 1157.

37 Bekanntmachung des Verwaltungschefs. 19.08.1916. LNA LVVA, 5434. f., 3. apr., 16. l., 29. lp.; Paziņojums. Dzimtenes Ziņas, No. 77, 27.09.1916., 5. lpp.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the war, the security policy in occupied countries was mostly unprepared, as shown by the absence of adequate secret police apparatus when Germany invaded the Baltics. This led to a mix of improvisation and transfers of experience from earlier but distant occupation regimes on other fronts. However, the creation of new structures caused a systemic stress on German home police system.

The lack of qualified police officers, particularly in terms of language skills, increased resorting to the occupied themselves, namely by taking advantage of the ethnic diversity and specificities of the occupied regions in order to fight the classical threats (espionage, sabotage, etc.); and to brutal methods against the new threat of wartime banditry.

This dynamic led to an unprecedented broadening of the definition of enemy, both by inventing new categories of enemy and by blurring the existing ones. It also created or deepened fractures not only between ethnic groups within occupied societies, but also between the majority of the occupied and the German authorities. The disruptive character of this dynamic on occupied societies, especially in terms of ethnic tensions, ultimately worsened the multiple crisis the newly independent Baltic states had to deal with after the retreat of the German occupiers.

Definējot ienaidnieku: militārā okupācija, drošības struktūras un pieredzes pārnese Vācijas pārvaldītajā Baltijā (1915–1918)

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Baltijas reģionam vairākos secīgos posmos nonākot Vācijas armijas kontrolē 1915. – 1918. gadā, tā iedzīvotāji pieredzēja vienu no galvenajiem Pirmā pasaules kara aspektiem – militāru okupāciju; fenomenu, kam ir ne tikai centrāla nozīme pilnvērtīgai izpratnei par kara procesiem, bet kas vienlaikus priekšplānā izvirzīja arī daudzšķautņainus impēriju dominances modeļus, pārveidojot militāro, politisko un sociālo ainavu turpmākajās desmitgadēs – gan nacionālā, gan reģionālā dimensijā.

Militārās okupācijas un transformējoši impēriju dominances modeļi kļuva par daļu no kara pieredzes miljoniem cilvēku visā Eiropā. Šo modeļu, kurus bieži raksturoja nacionālu grupu instrumentalizācija, resursu izlaupīšana, represijas un ilgtermiņa plāni institucionālas kontroles saglabāšanai, "sekmīgas" funkcionēšanas pamatā bija drošības un apdraudējuma jēdzieni, kā arī ietvari (vai arī to neesamība), kuros šie jautājumi tika risināt okupācijas armijas vai frontes tiešā aizmugurē, vienlaikus ņemot vērā aktīvas, ilgstošas un neparedzamas karadarbības kontekstu.

Lai arī militārām okupācijas pārvaldēm ir raksturīga augsta izolētības pakāpe, to pilnvērtīgai funkcionēšanai ir nepieciešamas arī saimnieciskas, politiskas un militāras saites ar citām okupētām teritorijām vai "mājas fronti". Šāda duāla izolētības un sasaistes dinamika sevišķi izpaudās drošības politikā, kurai Vācijas armijas okupētajā Baltijā, kas kļuva par daļu no Austrumu frontes virspavēlnieka pārvaldes apgabalā (*Ober Ost*), bija centrāla nozīme.

Lai izprastu, kā militārās pārvaldes drošības politika tika formulēta un īstenota, nepieciešams paplašināt ietvaru un ņemt vērā Eiropas mērogu, kurā Vācijas impērija veda karu vairākās frontēs un kontekstos – gan kā modernu, industriālu karu, gan kā okupāciju karu. Tādējādi raksta mērķis ir, izmantojot Vācijas okupācijas iestāžu galveno drošības struktūru piemēru, uzsvērt, ka Vācijas okupācijas iestāžu drošības politika Baltijā Pirmā pasaules kara laikā ir jāsaprot, ne tikai analizējot lokālo (nacionālo) un tuvējā reģiona problēmjautājumu ietvaru, bet arī aplūkojot ierobežojumus, resursu sadalījumu un pieredzes pārnesi Vācijas impērijā, kas bija kļuvusi par okupējošu lielvaru Eiropas mērogā.

Eiropā kara sākumposmā drošības politika okupētajās teritorijās vairumā gadījumu nebija noformulēta, par ko arī liecināja, piemēram, iebrukums Baltijas telpā, kur Vācijai nebija izveidots atbilstošs slepenpolicijas aparāts. Tas noveda improvizācijas un pieredzes pārņemšanas no agrākiem un ģeogrāfiski attāliem okupācijas režīmiem citās frontēs. Vienlaikus tas radīja arī sistemātisku noslodzi Vācijas iekšzemes policijas sistēmai.

Kvalificētu policijas darbinieku trūkums (īpaši – zemās svešvalodu prasmes) palielināja okupācijas varas paļaušanos uz okupēto sabiedrību, izmantojot reģiona etnisko un sociālo daudzveidību, lai cīnītos pret jau ierastiem draudiem (spiegošana, sabotāža u.c.), kā arī – izmantotu nežēlīgākas metodes, lai apspiestu jauno karalaika bandītisma fenomenu Baltijā. Šī dinamika izraisīja vēl nepieredzētu ienaidnieka jēdziena pārdefinēšanu, gan radot jaunas ienaidnieka kategorijas, gan paplašinot jau esošās. Šis process arī radīja un padziļināja plaisas ne tikai starp etniskajām grupām okupētajā sabiedrībā, bet arī starp iedzīvotāju vairākumu un vācu varas iestādēm. Šādas politikas graujošais raksturs savukārt saasināja etnisko spriedzi okupētajās teritorijās un veicināja daudzpusīgu krīzi, ar kuru jaunajām proklamētajām Baltijas valstīm nācās saskarties pēc Vācijas impērijas sabrukuma un kapitulācijas 1918. gadā.

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Raksts izstrādāts, balstoties uz pētījumiem, kas veikti arī Latvijas Zinātnes padomes finansētajā projektā "Latvijas 20.–21. gadsimta vēsture: sociālā morfoģenēze, mantojums un izaicinājumi", projekta nr. VPP-IZM-Vēsture-2023/1-0003.